Wednesday, August 05, 2009
[IWS] OECD: LEGISLATION, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING & ENFORCEMENT: UPDATING THE OECD EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION INDICATORS [2009]
IWS Documented News Service
_______________________________
Institute for Workplace Studies----------------- Professor Samuel B. Bacharach
School of Industrial & Labor Relations-------- Director, Institute for Workplace Studies
Cornell University
16 East 34th Street, 4th floor---------------------- Stuart Basefsky
New York, NY 10016 -------------------------------Director, IWS News Bureau
________________________________________________________________________
OECD
OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Paper No. 89
Legislation, Collective Bargaining and Enforcement: Updating the OECD Employment Protection Indicators
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/36/9/43116624.pdf
SUMMARY
This paper presents updated estimates of the OECD employment protection indicators for 30 OECD countries and 10 emerging economies and considers important aspects of employment protection other than those provided in legislation. Collective agreements often contain provisions relating to employment protection, but in most OECD countries, severance pay and notice periods in collective agreements are similar to those set out in legislation. Where bargaining takes place largely outside individual firms at the national, regional or sectoral level and collective agreements include provisions substantially more generous to employees than those in legislation, they are incorporated into the OECD indicators. Many OECD countries exempt some groups of firms or workers from employment protection rules. Such exemptions have mixed success in promoting employment among exempted groups, but do not have a large impact on the accuracy of the OECD indicators. More than half of OECD countries have specialised courts or procedures to handle unfair dismissal cases, reducing the time taken to deal with cases and improving satisfaction with legal outcomes. Resolving disputes early (either through pre-court dispute resolution procedures or pre-trial conciliation) saves time and money compared with waiting for a court decision. More research and cross-country comparable data are needed on the efficiency of conciliation procedures and the cost of pursuing or defending dismissal cases.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................................................ 2
SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................................. 3
RÉSUMÉ ........................................................................................................................................................ 3
LEGISLATION, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND ENFORCEMENT: UPDATING THE OECD EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION INDICATORS ............. 5
1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 5
2. Measuring employment protection ....................................................................................................... 6
3. Collective bargaining .......................................................................................................................... 15
4. Exemptions from employment protection legislation ......................................................................... 19
5. Enforcing employment protection and resolving disputes about dismissal ........................................ 27
6. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 37
ANNEX A. CALCULATING SUMMARY INDICATORS OF EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION STRICTNESS ....................... 38
ANNEX B. DATA DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES .............................................................................. 44
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................................. 48
List of Boxes
Box 1. Does legal original influence the strictness of employment protection? ............................... 9
Box 2. The political economy of employment protection reform in Portugal ................................. 11
Box 3. Incorporating collective bargaining into the OECD employment protection indicators ............ 19
Box 4. Taking small-firm exemptions into account when measuring employment protection .............. 21
Box 5. Some examples of non-enforcement of labour law ............................................................. 27
List of Figures
Figure 1. Strictness of employment protection, 2008 ............................................................................. 8
Figure 2. Changes in employment protection in OECD countries, 2003-2008 .................................... 10
Figure 3. Ranking OECD countries using alternative measures of employment protection, 2008 ............. 12
Figure 4. Relationship between specialisation and court/tribunal outcomes ........................................ 33
Figure 5. Pre-trial dispute resolution in selected countries ................................................................... 35
List of Tables
Table 1. Collective bargaining about employment protection in OECD and selected non-OECD countries ........... 16
Table 2. Small firm exemptions from employment protection, 2008 ................................................ 20
Table 3. Exemptions from employment protection for particular groups of workers, 2008.............. 23
Table 4. Non-standard contracts exempt from employment protection, 2008 ................................... 26
Table 5. Process for resolving non-discriminatory unfair dismissal disputes .................................... 29
Table A1. Quantifying the 21 basic measures of employment protection strictness ............................ 38
Table A2. Employment protection summary indicator weights ........................................................... 42
Table A3. Revisions to 2003 published data on employment protection ............................................. 43
______________________________
This information is provided to subscribers, friends, faculty, students and alumni of the School of Industrial & Labor Relations (ILR). It is a service of the Institute for Workplace Studies (IWS) in New York City. Stuart Basefsky is responsible for the selection of the contents which is intended to keep researchers, companies, workers, and governments aware of the latest information related to ILR disciplines as it becomes available for the purposes of research, understanding and debate. The content does not reflect the opinions or positions of Cornell University, the School of Industrial & Labor Relations, or that of Mr. Basefsky and should not be construed as such. The service is unique in that it provides the original source documentation, via links, behind the news and research of the day. Use of the information provided is unrestricted. However, it is requested that users acknowledge that the information was found via the IWS Documented News Service.
Stuart Basefsky
Director, IWS News Bureau
Institute for Workplace Studies
Cornell/ILR School
16 E. 34th Street, 4th Floor
New York, NY 10016
Telephone: (607) 255-2703
Fax: (607) 255-9641
E-mail: smb6@cornell.edu
****************************************
_______________________________
Institute for Workplace Studies----------------- Professor Samuel B. Bacharach
School of Industrial & Labor Relations-------- Director, Institute for Workplace Studies
Cornell University
16 East 34th Street, 4th floor---------------------- Stuart Basefsky
New York, NY 10016 -------------------------------Director, IWS News Bureau
________________________________________________________________________
OECD
OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Paper No. 89
Legislation, Collective Bargaining and Enforcement: Updating the OECD Employment Protection Indicators
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/36/9/43116624.pdf
SUMMARY
This paper presents updated estimates of the OECD employment protection indicators for 30 OECD countries and 10 emerging economies and considers important aspects of employment protection other than those provided in legislation. Collective agreements often contain provisions relating to employment protection, but in most OECD countries, severance pay and notice periods in collective agreements are similar to those set out in legislation. Where bargaining takes place largely outside individual firms at the national, regional or sectoral level and collective agreements include provisions substantially more generous to employees than those in legislation, they are incorporated into the OECD indicators. Many OECD countries exempt some groups of firms or workers from employment protection rules. Such exemptions have mixed success in promoting employment among exempted groups, but do not have a large impact on the accuracy of the OECD indicators. More than half of OECD countries have specialised courts or procedures to handle unfair dismissal cases, reducing the time taken to deal with cases and improving satisfaction with legal outcomes. Resolving disputes early (either through pre-court dispute resolution procedures or pre-trial conciliation) saves time and money compared with waiting for a court decision. More research and cross-country comparable data are needed on the efficiency of conciliation procedures and the cost of pursuing or defending dismissal cases.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................................................ 2
SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................................. 3
RÉSUMÉ ........................................................................................................................................................ 3
LEGISLATION, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND ENFORCEMENT: UPDATING THE OECD EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION INDICATORS ............. 5
1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 5
2. Measuring employment protection ....................................................................................................... 6
3. Collective bargaining .......................................................................................................................... 15
4. Exemptions from employment protection legislation ......................................................................... 19
5. Enforcing employment protection and resolving disputes about dismissal ........................................ 27
6. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 37
ANNEX A. CALCULATING SUMMARY INDICATORS OF EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION STRICTNESS ....................... 38
ANNEX B. DATA DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES .............................................................................. 44
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................................. 48
List of Boxes
Box 1. Does legal original influence the strictness of employment protection? ............................... 9
Box 2. The political economy of employment protection reform in Portugal ................................. 11
Box 3. Incorporating collective bargaining into the OECD employment protection indicators ............ 19
Box 4. Taking small-firm exemptions into account when measuring employment protection .............. 21
Box 5. Some examples of non-enforcement of labour law ............................................................. 27
List of Figures
Figure 1. Strictness of employment protection, 2008 ............................................................................. 8
Figure 2. Changes in employment protection in OECD countries, 2003-2008 .................................... 10
Figure 3. Ranking OECD countries using alternative measures of employment protection, 2008 ............. 12
Figure 4. Relationship between specialisation and court/tribunal outcomes ........................................ 33
Figure 5. Pre-trial dispute resolution in selected countries ................................................................... 35
List of Tables
Table 1. Collective bargaining about employment protection in OECD and selected non-OECD countries ........... 16
Table 2. Small firm exemptions from employment protection, 2008 ................................................ 20
Table 3. Exemptions from employment protection for particular groups of workers, 2008.............. 23
Table 4. Non-standard contracts exempt from employment protection, 2008 ................................... 26
Table 5. Process for resolving non-discriminatory unfair dismissal disputes .................................... 29
Table A1. Quantifying the 21 basic measures of employment protection strictness ............................ 38
Table A2. Employment protection summary indicator weights ........................................................... 42
Table A3. Revisions to 2003 published data on employment protection ............................................. 43
______________________________
This information is provided to subscribers, friends, faculty, students and alumni of the School of Industrial & Labor Relations (ILR). It is a service of the Institute for Workplace Studies (IWS) in New York City. Stuart Basefsky is responsible for the selection of the contents which is intended to keep researchers, companies, workers, and governments aware of the latest information related to ILR disciplines as it becomes available for the purposes of research, understanding and debate. The content does not reflect the opinions or positions of Cornell University, the School of Industrial & Labor Relations, or that of Mr. Basefsky and should not be construed as such. The service is unique in that it provides the original source documentation, via links, behind the news and research of the day. Use of the information provided is unrestricted. However, it is requested that users acknowledge that the information was found via the IWS Documented News Service.
Stuart Basefsky
Director, IWS News Bureau
Institute for Workplace Studies
Cornell/ILR School
16 E. 34th Street, 4th Floor
New York, NY 10016
Telephone: (607) 255-2703
Fax: (607) 255-9641
E-mail: smb6@cornell.edu
****************************************
# posted by SBasefsky : 12:41 PM
