Monday, February 26, 2007
[IWS] CRS: TPA/Fast-Track Renewal: LABOR ISSUES [2 February 2007]
IWS Documented News Service
_______________________________
Institute for Workplace Studies----------------- Professor Samuel B. Bacharach
School of Industrial & Labor Relations-------- Director, Institute for Workplace Studies
Cornell University
16 East 34th Street, 4th floor---------------------- Stuart Basefsky
New York, NY 10016 -------------------------------Director, IWS News Bureau
________________________________________________________________________
Congressional Research Service (CRS)
Order Code RL33864
Trade Promotion Authority (TPA)/Fast-Track Renewal: Labor Issues [2 February 2007]
February 2, 2007
Mary Jane Bolle, Specialist in International Trade, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
http://www.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33864_20070202.pdf
[full-text, 22 pages]
Summary
Trade promotion authority (TPA), formerly known as "fast-track" authority, is
scheduled to expire July 1, 2007. With it will expire the authority: (a) that Congress
grants the President to enter into certain trade agreements, and (b) for Congress to
consider the agreements' implementing legislation under expedited procedures.
Currently, the Administration is negotiating a number of trade agreements that may
not be completed before the current TPA is set to expire. If these activities are to
continue, TPA/fast-track renewal may be a central issue in the 110th Congress. Within
the debate, a major issue is expected to be whether to include as a principal
negotiating objective in trade agreements, "enforceable core labor standards."
Two TPA/fast-track authorities have incorporated labor provisions. The first,
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (OTCA), which expired in
1994, included the broad, general objective: "to promote worker rights." The North
American Free Trade Agreement, with its labor side agreement, was negotiated under
OTCA. The second and current TPA/fast-track authority with labor provisions, the
Trade Act of 2002, includes protections for labor, modified by protections for country
governments, businesses and investors. Seven free trade agreements (FTAs) with
Chile, Singapore, Australia, Morocco, Bahrain, Oman, and the Dominican Republic
and Central America were negotiated under this authority. All have only one
enforceable labor requirement: that each country not fail to enforce its own labor
laws in a manner affecting trade between the parties. (In contrast to this, the
U.S.-Jordan FTA, negotiated in 2000 and approved in 2001 without TPA/fast track
authority, includes enforceable labor provisions.)
Major options for labor provisions in renewed TPA focus on whether principal
negotiating objectives should include "enforceable core labor standards." Supporters
argue that including these could help: (1) slow the offshoring of certain U.S. jobs; (2)
protect foreign workers against exploitative corporate behavior; (3) support the
ability of workers to share in the gains from international trade; and (4) fend off an
international "race to the bottom" based on labor costs. Opponents argue that: (1)
core labor standards should be promoted by the International Labor Organization, not
by trade agreements; (2) as countries develop, they adopt higher labor standards on
their own; (3) stronger worker protections could discourage international investment;
and (4) labor standards are disguised protectionism. History shows that with or
without FTAs, trade will likely continue to grow.
This report examines issues relating to TPA/fast-track labor provisions in the
larger context of global labor issues. It: (1) identifies the players and their positions;
(2) tracks the enforceable labor provisions in TPA/fast-track laws and the FTAs
negotiated under them; (3) presents some legislative options for new TPA/fast-track
labor provisions; and (4) sets out arguments for and against enforceable core labor
standards. Finally, it looks at possible outcomes and implications of the various
legislative options. This report will be updated as events warrant.
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Which Set of Core Labor Standards? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Who Cares About Enforceable Core Labor Standards, and Why? . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Labor Advocates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Business Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Developing Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
U.S. Executive Branch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Key Labor Provisions in TPA/Fast-Track Laws and in Trade Agreements Negotiated Under Them .. . . . . 5
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988: NAFTA . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
No TPA/Fast-Track Law: The Jordan Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002: Seven Trade Agreements . . . . . . . . 6
Legislative Options for TPA/Fast-Track Renewal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Option 1: No TPA/Fast-Track Renewal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Option 2: TPA/Fast-Track Renewal with No Enforceable Labor Provisions . . . . . . . . . 8
Option 3: TPA/Fast-Track Labor Provisions Similar to Those Under the Expiring Authority . . . .. . . . 9
Option 4: TPA/Fast-Track Labor Provisions Setting out Enforceable Core Labor Provisions as Principal Negotiating Objectives . . . . . . . . . 9
The 2001 Rangel Bill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Arguments For and Against Enforceable Core Labor Standards as a Principal Negotiating Objective . .. . . 10
General Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Arguments Related to U.S. Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Arguments Related to Foreign Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Sovereignty Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Arguments on the Definition of Core Labor Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Possible Outcomes and implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
List of Figures
Figure 1. TPA/Fast-Track Laws and Their Labor Provisions, and FTAs and Their Enforceable Labor Provisions, 1974-2007 .. . . . . . . 8
List of Tables
Appendix Table 1. Worker Rights Provisions in TPA/Fast-Track Authority, 1974-2007 . .. . . . 16
Appendix Table 2. Key Labor Provisions in FTAs Negotiated Under Various TPA/Fast-Track Laws . . . . 17
Appendix Table 3. Enforceable Labor Provisions Included in H.R. 3019 (Rangel, 107th Congress) . . . . . . 18
______________________________
This information is provided to subscribers, friends, faculty, students and alumni of the School of Industrial & Labor Relations (ILR). It is a service of the Institute for Workplace Studies (IWS) in New York City. Stuart Basefsky is responsible for the selection of the contents which is intended to keep researchers, companies, workers, and governments aware of the latest information related to ILR disciplines as it becomes available for the purposes of research, understanding and debate. The content does not reflect the opinions or positions of Cornell University, the School of Industrial & Labor Relations, or that of Mr. Basefsky and should not be construed as such. The service is unique in that it provides the original source documentation, via links, behind the news and research of the day. Use of the information provided is unrestricted. However, it is requested that users acknowledge that the information was found via the IWS Documented News Service.
Stuart Basefsky
Director, IWS News Bureau
Institute for Workplace Studies
Cornell/ILR School
16 E. 34th Street, 4th Floor
New York, NY 10016
Telephone: (607) 255-2703
Fax: (607) 255-9641
E-mail: smb6@cornell.edu
****************************************
_______________________________
Institute for Workplace Studies----------------- Professor Samuel B. Bacharach
School of Industrial & Labor Relations-------- Director, Institute for Workplace Studies
Cornell University
16 East 34th Street, 4th floor---------------------- Stuart Basefsky
New York, NY 10016 -------------------------------Director, IWS News Bureau
________________________________________________________________________
Congressional Research Service (CRS)
Order Code RL33864
Trade Promotion Authority (TPA)/Fast-Track Renewal: Labor Issues [2 February 2007]
February 2, 2007
Mary Jane Bolle, Specialist in International Trade, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
http://www.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33864_20070202.pdf
[full-text, 22 pages]
Summary
Trade promotion authority (TPA), formerly known as "fast-track" authority, is
scheduled to expire July 1, 2007. With it will expire the authority: (a) that Congress
grants the President to enter into certain trade agreements, and (b) for Congress to
consider the agreements' implementing legislation under expedited procedures.
Currently, the Administration is negotiating a number of trade agreements that may
not be completed before the current TPA is set to expire. If these activities are to
continue, TPA/fast-track renewal may be a central issue in the 110th Congress. Within
the debate, a major issue is expected to be whether to include as a principal
negotiating objective in trade agreements, "enforceable core labor standards."
Two TPA/fast-track authorities have incorporated labor provisions. The first,
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (OTCA), which expired in
1994, included the broad, general objective: "to promote worker rights." The North
American Free Trade Agreement, with its labor side agreement, was negotiated under
OTCA. The second and current TPA/fast-track authority with labor provisions, the
Trade Act of 2002, includes protections for labor, modified by protections for country
governments, businesses and investors. Seven free trade agreements (FTAs) with
Chile, Singapore, Australia, Morocco, Bahrain, Oman, and the Dominican Republic
and Central America were negotiated under this authority. All have only one
enforceable labor requirement: that each country not fail to enforce its own labor
laws in a manner affecting trade between the parties. (In contrast to this, the
U.S.-Jordan FTA, negotiated in 2000 and approved in 2001 without TPA/fast track
authority, includes enforceable labor provisions.)
Major options for labor provisions in renewed TPA focus on whether principal
negotiating objectives should include "enforceable core labor standards." Supporters
argue that including these could help: (1) slow the offshoring of certain U.S. jobs; (2)
protect foreign workers against exploitative corporate behavior; (3) support the
ability of workers to share in the gains from international trade; and (4) fend off an
international "race to the bottom" based on labor costs. Opponents argue that: (1)
core labor standards should be promoted by the International Labor Organization, not
by trade agreements; (2) as countries develop, they adopt higher labor standards on
their own; (3) stronger worker protections could discourage international investment;
and (4) labor standards are disguised protectionism. History shows that with or
without FTAs, trade will likely continue to grow.
This report examines issues relating to TPA/fast-track labor provisions in the
larger context of global labor issues. It: (1) identifies the players and their positions;
(2) tracks the enforceable labor provisions in TPA/fast-track laws and the FTAs
negotiated under them; (3) presents some legislative options for new TPA/fast-track
labor provisions; and (4) sets out arguments for and against enforceable core labor
standards. Finally, it looks at possible outcomes and implications of the various
legislative options. This report will be updated as events warrant.
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Which Set of Core Labor Standards? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Who Cares About Enforceable Core Labor Standards, and Why? . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Labor Advocates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Business Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Developing Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
U.S. Executive Branch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Key Labor Provisions in TPA/Fast-Track Laws and in Trade Agreements Negotiated Under Them .. . . . . 5
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988: NAFTA . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
No TPA/Fast-Track Law: The Jordan Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002: Seven Trade Agreements . . . . . . . . 6
Legislative Options for TPA/Fast-Track Renewal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Option 1: No TPA/Fast-Track Renewal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Option 2: TPA/Fast-Track Renewal with No Enforceable Labor Provisions . . . . . . . . . 8
Option 3: TPA/Fast-Track Labor Provisions Similar to Those Under the Expiring Authority . . . .. . . . 9
Option 4: TPA/Fast-Track Labor Provisions Setting out Enforceable Core Labor Provisions as Principal Negotiating Objectives . . . . . . . . . 9
The 2001 Rangel Bill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Arguments For and Against Enforceable Core Labor Standards as a Principal Negotiating Objective . .. . . 10
General Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Arguments Related to U.S. Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Arguments Related to Foreign Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Sovereignty Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Arguments on the Definition of Core Labor Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Possible Outcomes and implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
List of Figures
Figure 1. TPA/Fast-Track Laws and Their Labor Provisions, and FTAs and Their Enforceable Labor Provisions, 1974-2007 .. . . . . . . 8
List of Tables
Appendix Table 1. Worker Rights Provisions in TPA/Fast-Track Authority, 1974-2007 . .. . . . 16
Appendix Table 2. Key Labor Provisions in FTAs Negotiated Under Various TPA/Fast-Track Laws . . . . 17
Appendix Table 3. Enforceable Labor Provisions Included in H.R. 3019 (Rangel, 107th Congress) . . . . . . 18
______________________________
This information is provided to subscribers, friends, faculty, students and alumni of the School of Industrial & Labor Relations (ILR). It is a service of the Institute for Workplace Studies (IWS) in New York City. Stuart Basefsky is responsible for the selection of the contents which is intended to keep researchers, companies, workers, and governments aware of the latest information related to ILR disciplines as it becomes available for the purposes of research, understanding and debate. The content does not reflect the opinions or positions of Cornell University, the School of Industrial & Labor Relations, or that of Mr. Basefsky and should not be construed as such. The service is unique in that it provides the original source documentation, via links, behind the news and research of the day. Use of the information provided is unrestricted. However, it is requested that users acknowledge that the information was found via the IWS Documented News Service.
Stuart Basefsky
Director, IWS News Bureau
Institute for Workplace Studies
Cornell/ILR School
16 E. 34th Street, 4th Floor
New York, NY 10016
Telephone: (607) 255-2703
Fax: (607) 255-9641
E-mail: smb6@cornell.edu
****************************************
# posted by SBasefsky : 1:40 PM
