Monday, October 25, 2010
[IWS] CRS: CHINA'S SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND: DEVELOPMENTS & POLICY IMPLICATIONS [23 September 2010]
IWS Documented News Service
_______________________________
Institute for Workplace Studies----------------- Professor Samuel B. Bacharach
School of Industrial & Labor Relations-------- Director, Institute for Workplace Studies
Cornell University
16 East 34th Street, 4th floor---------------------- Stuart Basefsky
New York, NY 10016 -------------------------------Director, IWS News Bureau
________________________________________________________________________
Congressional Research Service (CRS)
China’s Sovereign Wealth Fund: Developments and Policy Implications
Michael F. Martin, Specialist in Asian Affairs
September 23, 2010
http://opencrs.com/document/R41441/2010-09-23/download/1013/
[full-text, 16 pages]
Summary
China’s ruling executive body, the State Council, established the China Investment Corporation
(CIC), a sovereign wealth fund, in September 2007 to invest $200 billion of China’s then $1.4
trillion in foreign exchange reserves. As with other sovereign wealth funds worldwide, the CIC’s
existence allows China to invest its reserves in a wide range of assets, including stocks, bonds,
and hedge funds. After a rocky start in which it incurred losses of 2.1% on its global investments
in 2008 – caused in part by aftereffects of the global financial crisis of 2007 – the CIC’s rate of
return in 2009 rose to 11.7%. The State Council is reportedly considering a CIC request for an
additional $200 billion out of China’s $2.5 trillion in foreign exchange reserves.
Congress and financial analysts raised concerns about the CIC after its creation, partly because it
was a comparatively large sovereign wealth fund, partly because it was government-owned, and
partly because it reported directly to the State Council. Some observers were apprehensive that
the Chinese government would use the CIC to acquire control over strategically important natural
resources, obtain access to sensitive technology, and/or disrupt international financial markets.
The CIC attempted to counter these concerns by announcing that its investment strategy would
conform to international standards, and sought only to maximize its “risk-adjusted financial
return.” The CIC also promised to avoid politically and strategically sensitive investments.
The CIC has been the focus of discussions among China’s leadership about its economic
objectives and its organizational structure. Soon after its creation, the CIC became the sole owner
of Central Huijin Investment Limited (Central Huijin), an investment fund established by China’s
central bank, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), as a vehicle for injecting capital into major
Chinese banks. Over the last three years, Central Huijin has provided billions of dollars to the
Bank of China (BOC), the China Construction Bank (CCB), the Industrial and Commercial Bank
of China (ICBC), and other financial institutions. Some analysts maintain that there is an inherent
conflict between the CIC’s goal to maximize its return on investments and Central Huijin’s
mission to provide capital to domestic financial institutions, and advocate their separation. While
there have been reports of a possible separation, Central Huijin remains a subsidiary of the CIC.
Concerns about the CIC’s investment activities reemerged in 2009 when it greatly expanded its
overseas holdings, and began acquiring stakes in energy companies, natural resource companies
and alternative energy companies. According to its filings with the Security and Exchange
Commission (SEC), the CIC had holdings in 82 U.S. entities as of December 31, 2009.
Commentators once again questioned the true goals of the CIC’s investment strategy. The CIC
maintains that its main mission is to maximize its long-term, risk-adjusted rate of return.
For Congress, the investment activities of the CIC and its subsidiary, Central Huijin, raise
questions about U.S. policies on inward foreign direct investment (FDI) and the global
competitiveness of U.S. financial institutions. Some question if the current controls on inward
FDI via the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, SEC, and other agencies
provide adequate protection of U.S. strategic assets and technology from investments by the CIC
and other Chinese entities. Others are concerned that Central Huijin’s assistance to Chinese banks
and financial institutions are part of a larger strategy to increase China’s influence in strategic
markets. These commentators suggest that more should be done to protect the United States from
China’s rising role in international capital markets.
This report will not be updated.
Contents
Introduction ...............................................................................................................................1
Background ...............................................................................................................................2
Overview of the CIC...................................................................................................................3
The CIC’s Investment Activities..................................................................................................4
Investments by the CIC.........................................................................................................4
Investments by Central Huijin...............................................................................................7
China’s Debate over the Role of the CIC.....................................................................................8
Concerns About the CIC .............................................................................................................9
Congressional Considerations ...................................................................................................10
Tables
Table 1. Leading Sovereign Wealth Funds (as of April 2008).......................................................1
Table 2. Major Investments by the CIC .......................................................................................5
Table 3. the CIC’s Global Portfolio Holdings by Type of Investment ...........................................7
Table 4. Central Huijin’s Investments ..........................................................................................8
Appendixes
Appendix. The CIC’s Holdings of Companies, Investment Funds, and Index Funds...................12
Contacts
Author Contact Information ......................................................................................................13
________________________________________________________________________
This information is provided to subscribers, friends, faculty, students and alumni of the School of Industrial & Labor Relations (ILR). It is a service of the Institute for Workplace Studies (IWS) in New York City. Stuart Basefsky is responsible for the selection of the contents which is intended to keep researchers, companies, workers, and governments aware of the latest information related to ILR disciplines as it becomes available for the purposes of research, understanding and debate. The content does not reflect the opinions or positions of Cornell University, the School of Industrial & Labor Relations, or that of Mr. Basefsky and should not be construed as such. The service is unique in that it provides the original source documentation, via links, behind the news and research of the day. Use of the information provided is unrestricted. However, it is requested that users acknowledge that the information was found via the IWS Documented News Service.
****************************************
Stuart Basefsky
Director, IWS News Bureau
Institute for Workplace Studies
Cornell/ILR School
16 E. 34th Street, 4th Floor
New York, NY 10016
Telephone: (607) 255-2703
Fax: (607) 255-9641
E-mail: smb6@cornell.edu
****************************************