Tuesday, March 13, 2012

[IWS] CRS: BAHRAIN: REFORM, SECURITY, AND U.S. POLICY [21 February 2012]

IWS Documented News Service

_______________________________

Institute for Workplace Studies----------------- Professor Samuel B. Bacharach

School of Industrial & Labor Relations-------- Director, Institute for Workplace Studies

Cornell University

16 East 34th Street, 4th floor---------------------- Stuart Basefsky

New York, NY 10016 -------------------------------Director, IWS News Bureau

________________________________________________________________________

 

Congressional Research Service (CRS)

 

Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy

Kenneth Katzman, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

February 21, 2012

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/95-1013.pdf

[full-text, 34 pages]

 

Summary

An uprising that began in Bahrain on February 14, 2011, following the revolt that overthrew

Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak three days earlier, began a political crisis that defies resolution.

Bahrain’s unrest demonstrates that Shiite grievances over the distribution of power and economic

opportunities were not satisfied by the efforts during 1999-2010 to increase the role of the Shiite

majority in governance; most Bahraini Shiites now say they seek a constitutional monarchy in

which governments are established by an elected parliament. Reflecting increasing polarization,

many Sunnis in Bahrain believe the Shiite majority will settle for nothing less than outright rule.

As protests escalated in March 2011, Bahrain’s government bucked U.S. advice by inviting direct

security assistance from other Gulf Cooperation Council countries, declaring a state of

emergency, forcefully suppressing demonstrations, and arresting dissident leaders and proopposition

health care workers. Although the state of emergency ended on June 1, 2011, the

continued imprisonment of dissidents contributed to the resulting failure of a “national dialogue,”

held in July 2011, to reach on more than just a few political reform recommendations. Hopes for

resolution were raised by a pivotal report by a government-appointed “Independent Commission

of Inquiry” (BICI) on the unrest, released November 23, 2011, which was critical of the

government’s actions against the unrest as well as the opposition’s responses to government

proposals early in the crisis. The government, through an appointed national commission, has

begun to implement most of the BICI recommendations, but the stalemate on major political

reforms has contributed to the resumption of some renewed violent demonstrations and dashed

hopes that a complete solution is in sight.

 

The Obama Administration has not called for a change of the Al Khalifa regime, but it has

opposed the regime’s use of force against protesters and urged further and faster political reform.

The U.S. position on Bahrain has been criticized by those who believe the United States is

downplaying regime abuses because the U.S. security relationship with the Al Khalifa regime is

critical to U.S. efforts to contain Iran and preserve security in the Persian Gulf more broadly. In

exchange for a tacit security guarantee against Iran or other aggressors, Bahrain has provided key

support for U.S. interests by hosting U.S. naval headquarters for the Gulf for over 60 years and by

providing facilities and small numbers of personnel for U.S. war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

U.S. officials are concerned that the instability in Bahrain could render U.S. use of the naval

headquarters facilities untenable, but there are no evident moves to relocate it. Beyond the naval

facility, the United States signed a formal defense pact with Bahrain in 1991 and has designated

Bahrain as a “major non-NATO ally,” entitling it to sales of sophisticated U.S. weapons systems.

Bahrain also receives small amounts of U.S. security assistance. New U.S. sales and aid are

coming under criticism from human rights and other groups and, in response, the Administration

put on hold a significant proposed sale of armored vehicles and anti-tank weapons while

approving smaller sales of military spare parts. Factoring into the U.S. position is a perception

that Iran might seek to take advantage of Shiite unrest in Bahrain to reduce U.S. influence and the

U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf. Consumed by its own crisis, Bahrain has joined with

but deferred to other GCC powers in initiatives to resolve uprisings in Libya, Syria, and Yemen.

 

Fueling Shiite unrest is the fact that Bahrain, having largely run out of crude oil reserves, is

poorer than most of the other Persian Gulf monarchies. The country has tried to compensate

through diversification, particularly with banking and some manufacturing. In September 2004,

the United States and Bahrain signed a free trade agreement (FTA); legislation implementing it

was signed January 11, 2006 (P.L. 109-169). The unrest in 2011 has further strained Bahrain’s

economy.

 

Contents

The Political Structure, Reform, and Human Rights ....................................................................... 1

Some Separation of Powers Established by King Hamad......................................................... 2

Post-Charter Elections and Political Groups ............................................................................. 3

2002 Elections..................................................................................................................... 3

2006 Elections: Allegations of Gerrymandering and “Importing Sunnis”.......................... 3

The 2010 National Assembly and Municipal Election: Prelude to the Uprising................. 4

2011 Uprising: Origin, Developments, and Prognosis .............................................................. 6

Government Tactics Change, As Do Protester Demands .................................................... 7

The Saudi/GCC Intervention and Crackdown..................................................................... 8

Post-GCC Intervention Situation/End of State of Emergency ............................................ 8

Disputes Over Political Reform: National Dialogue and Results ..................................... 10

BICI Report on Handling of the Unrest: Reaction and Implementation........................... 12

U.S. Posture on the Uprising............................................................................................. 14

Other Human Rights Issues ..................................................................................................... 17

Women’s Rights ................................................................................................................ 17

Religious Freedom ............................................................................................................ 17

Labor Rights...................................................................................................................... 18

Human Trafficking ............................................................................................................ 18

Executions and Torture...................................................................................................... 18

U.S.-Bahrain Security and Foreign Policy Relations..................................................................... 18

U.S. Navy Headquarters in Bahrain ........................................................................................ 19

Defense Pact and Cooperation With U.S. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan....................... 20

Post-September 11 and Post-Saddam Cooperation ........................................................... 20

U.S. Arms Transfers and Military Aid..................................................................................... 21

Purchases With National Funds......................................................................................... 22

September 2011 Humvee and TOW Sale.......................................................................... 22

Anti-Terrorism Cooperation .................................................................................................... 23

Relations with and Cooperation Against Iran.......................................................................... 24

Bahrain-Iran Gas Development Deal and Other Economic Ties....................................... 25

Other Foreign Policy Issues..................................................................................................... 26

Qatar Territorial Disputes.................................................................................................. 27

Arab-Israeli Issues............................................................................................................. 27

Economic Issues ............................................................................................................................ 28

 

Figures

Figure 1. Bahrain ........................................................................................................................... 30

 

Tables

Table 1. Comparative Composition of National Assembly.............................................................. 6

Table 2. Some Basic Facts About Bahrain..................................................................................... 29

Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Bahrain............................................................................................... 29

 

 

 

 

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